Introduction
Job mobility is a major source of wage inequality in modern labor markets. Individuals typically change jobs either to improve employment matches-which frequently leads to higher wages (Jovanovic 1979; Sørensen and Sorenson 2007)-or to retain their employment status and avoid unemployment. However, because not all employees are equally mobile and because the returns on job mobility differ, workers' wages typically diverge over the life course (Abbott and Beach 1994; Fuller 2008; Keith and McWilliams 1995, 1997; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010b; Ruhm 1987; Topel and Ward 1992) . The influences on and consequences of job mobility are thus major contributors to social stratification.
Thus far, research on the influences on and returns to job mobility has mostly differentiated between mobile and non-mobile workers, thereby only analyzing one specific type of mobility or treating all types of job changes similarly. However, we argue that multiple types of job changes with differential returns are closely linked to one another. When few local employers are hiring in an employee's current occupation, changing occupations and changing regions are two alternative strategies that offer pathways to other potential vacancies. However, both mobility types are connected to unique sets of constraints. Given the high cost associated with occupational mobility, regional mobility within the same occupation will generally be more attractive. By contrast, when the costs of regional mobility are high, changing one's occupation locally will appear more attractive.
First and foremost, these two types of mobility are a means of increasing wages and offer alternative pathways if one type of mobility is too costly. In this sense, both types of mobility increase the number of vacancies that employees can potentially occupy and thus contribute to more equal opportunities for workers. If an individual is unable to change jobs using the preferred strategy, the other strategy provides an alternative. However, because occupational changes typically involve a devaluation of human capital, substituting occupational mobility for regional mobility will likely lead to lower wage increases (Kambourov and Manovskii 2009b) . Therefore, the trade-off will likely also contribute to unequal wage trajectories between certain actors in the labor market if they have systematic differences in the costs of one of the two mobility types, such as parents versus non-parents, cohabitating couples versus single individuals, or workers in jobs with different skill demands. Moreover, the tradeoff may contribute to our understanding of differences in job mobility and wage inequality when costs for either type of mobility systematically differ, for instance, between national labor markets.
We use retrospective survey data for Germany, which are linked to administrative data from the Federal Employment Agency (ALWA-ADIAB). Employing Fine and Gray models for competing risks, we first demonstrate the mobility trade-off by showing how the costs associated with either regional or occupational mobility influence both mobility types simultaneously. We can thus explain effects that appear surprising when considering these two mobility options independently; for instance, we find that parents with school-aged children or employees with a partner in the household are more likely to make local occupational changes. These effects are understandable given that occupational mobility serves as an alternative strategy for regional mobility, which is simultaneously reduced. Using fixed-effects regressions, we are then able to estimate the effects of occupational and regional mobility when workers change jobs to elucidate how this trade-off contributes to differential returns on job mobility.
Our analysis contributes to our understanding of the influences on and consequences of job mobility (Blau and Duncan 1967; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010b) , specifically with regard to differences in wage trajectories over the course of employees' careers (Fuller 2008) . In addition, we link our study to research that identifies occupations as a major source of stratification, as we find that not only factors known to influence regional mobility but also occupational characteristics determine the type of job mobility, thereby contributing to differential careers and wage inequality (Bol and Weeden 2015; Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996; Hatt 1950; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009a; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010a; Weeden 2002; Williams 2012) .
Theoretical Background

Job Mobility and Wage Inequality
Prior research has consistently argued that job mobility is an important driver of wage inequality (Blau and Duncan 1967; Fuller 2008; Mouw and Kalleberg 2010b) . In the labor market, increased skill requirements, overqualification, technological and institutional change, and/or actors' incomplete information can lead to suboptimal employer-employee matches (Fernandez 2001; Kalleberg 2008; Mortensen 1988; Vaisey 2006; Oesch and Rodriguez Menes 2010) . As a consequence, productivity falls short, employment relationships become insecure, and wage growth decreases (Jovanovic 1979) . Therefore, employees can be assumed to continuously search for better jobs and attempt to escape inferior employment contracts (Burdett 1978; Sørensen and Kalleberg 1981) . Accordingly, job mobility increases employees' chances in the labor market with respect to their earnings, careers, and statuses (Bartel 1979 (Bartel , 1982 Bowles 1970; Brett and Reilly 1988; Keith and McWilliams 1995 , 1997 , 1999 le Grand and Thålin 2002) . Moreover, job mobility can prevent wage losses due to unstable or fixed-term relationships. However, we empirically observe that not all employees are equally likely to change jobs and that not everyone profits to the same degree from job changes. Career status, schooling, or gender influence the probability of job mobility (Keith and McWilliams 1999; Royalty 1998; Topel and Ward 1992) . The returns on job mobility differ according to the mobility type, the timing, the reason for mobility, labor-force attachment, and/or the position from which workers conduct their searches (Abbott and Beach 1994; Fuller 2008; Keith and McWilliams 1995, 1997; Ruhm 1987; Topel and Ward 1992) . Analyzing the influences on and consequences of job mobility thus helps illuminate the emergence of social inequality.
Occupational and Regional Mobility as Substitutes
We argue that the returns on job mobility are affected by a trade-off between occupational and regional mobility. Notably, occupational and regional mobility are not often linked in the literature, which is surprising if we consider that they are frequently two sides of the same coin. Employees who seek to improve their labor market positions or to avoid unemployment should prefer to do so without any mobility costs and attempt to find better jobs within their local regions (Simpson 1992 ) and existing occupations.
However, there are often insufficient local vacancies, which poses occupational and regional mobility as alternative strategies to achieve better matches. Employees can either change their occupation and stay within their current region or relocate or commute long distances to find a job in their existing occupation. The same logic applies to job mobility that results from unstable or terminated employment relations and the prevention of earnings losses. Labor market flexibilization and destabilizing careers impose a higher need for job mobility. Hacket (2009) shows that, in this context, regional mobility does not necessarily lead to greater wage increases but rather reduces the risk of wage losses. Employees who are coming from unstable employment relations have lower bargaining power, and we expect lower wage increases and perhaps solely the prevention of earnings losses. However, we assume that the first strategy will still be to find a job in the same occupational area without having to relocate. If no adequate vacancies can be found, the employee again faces the alternative strategies of changing occupations or changing regions.
With no consideration of mobility costs, employees will prefer one strategy over the other, and only the attractiveness of a job posting will likely affect an employee's choice of mobility type. Indeed, previous research has shown that joint observable and unobservable cost factors influence different types of job mobility simultaneously. In this context, an employee's willingness to relocate influences the likelihood of job mobility and may thus influence both occupational and regional mobility (Huinink, Vidal, and Kley 2014) . However, each type of mobility is linked to specific sets of cost factors, and the probability ratio for regional and occupational mobility can change. From previous research, we know that numerous distinct restrictions on both regional and occupational mobility exist and that mobility will occur only if the benefits exceed the costs, assuming rationally calculating actors (Bowles 1970; Hunt and Kau 1985; Speare 1971; Sjaastad 1962; Yankow 2003) . Accordingly, regional mobility, which is clearly connected to costs, can be shown to have a positive impact on wages and occupational achievement (Yankow 2003; Mulder and van Ham 2005) .
A mixed strategy in which employees change both their occupation and region is thus rather unlikely because they will then have to accept two sets of cost factors. However, regional preferences, tied moves, or the concentration of high-paying jobs in specific regions may evoke regional and occupational changes in rare cases. In most cases, only one type of mobility should be chosen as an alternative to local intra-occupational changes. If restrictions on one type of mobility increase, we expect that employees will resort to the other type of mobility as a substitute.
With respect to regional mobility, costs typically relate to relocating one's household, commuting, selling or buying a house, and/or the loss of social contacts and familiar places. In general, these costs can be viewed as investments in location-specific capital and regional ties that are lost through migration (Abraham and Nisic 2007; DaVanzo 1983) . Numerous studies reveal that these costs-and the ability to bear them-vary across individuals and depend on their characteristics. Key determinants influencing the likelihood of regional mobility include an employee's qualifications, race, personal attitudes, age, gender, spouse's attitudes, parental status, and social roles (Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010; Bartel 1979; Brett, Stroh, and Reilly 1993; Eby and Russell 2000; Gould and Penley 1985; Hardill 2002; Landau, Shamir, and Arthur 1992; Rogers 1988; South and Deane 1993; van Ham, Mulder, and Hooimeijer 2001; Kley 2011) . We focus on strong restrictions on regional mobility that strengthen local ties either through the time spent in a location or through the household composition. The time spent in a location will foster local networks. A partner or school-aged children in the household will also have local ties that would be lost in case of relocation. Moreover, commuting will reduce the time that can be spent at home and thus impose costs as well. We therefore expect that [H1-H3] having a partner in the household, school-aged children in the household, and a longer residence duration will each make regional mobility within the same occupation less likely and occupational changes within the same region more likely.
The costs of occupational mobility-not necessarily upward or downward mobility but changes to other occupations-are typically associated with the characteristics of occupations. Because human capital is mostly occupation and/ or industry specific (Kambourov and Manovskii 2008, 2009b) , devaluation is particularly high if such capital is accumulated through one's time spent in a particular job or a specific industry. Moreover, occupations can be understood as institutions that consist of rules that link the education system with the labor market, which facilitates changes within the same occupation and limits changes between occupations. Before entering the labor market, people acquire defined sets of skills and competences, for example through vocational training, academic studies, or internships. These skill sets are frequently mirrored in jobs that require specific sets of competences. The level of skill demands thus captures the part of occupation-specific human capital that is not covered by the time spent in an occupation and introduces a secondary cost factor of occupational mobility.
Furthermore, some occupations are closed to a certain degree, and entry into these jobs is restricted to employees with defined credentials. Closure is based on the capability of social groups to organize themselves along occupational lines and to establish and defend socially accepted-institutionalized-boundaries. Such institutionalized boundaries increase the opportunities for hoarding benefits such as social status, prestige, employment security, and (particularly) wages by forming effective monopolies on occupations. As research has shown, employees in these occupations are indeed able to realize higher wages (Bol and Weeden 2014; Granovetter and Tilly 1988; Weeden 2002) , which makes abandoning these occupations less attractive. Accordingly, matching in closed systems yields higher reward attainment (Eliason 1995) . Moreover, entering closed occupations generally requires greater investments that are forfeited in case an employee leaves that occupation. We thus expect that [H4-H6] more occupation-specific human capital, higher skill demands, and stronger occupational closure will each make occupational mobility within the same region less likely and trans-regional changes within the occupation more likely.
Differential Returns on Occupational and Regional Mobility
We have argued that occupational and regional mobility should serve as substitutes for workers who are trying to improve their labor market position or avoid unemployment. We thus expect both mobility options, on average, to provide wage increases. Indeed, previous research has shown that, compared with immobility, both regional and occupational mobility can improve matching and yield benefits (Aldashev 2012; Fitzenberger and Kunze 2005; Hunt and Kau 1985; Longhi and Brynin 2010; Longhi and Taylor 2013; Yankow 2003) . However, we expect that, compared with regional mobility, occupational mobility will lead to lower wage increases and thus contribute to differential returns on job mobility and, in turn, differences in the wage trajectories of certain actors in the labor market that show differences in the costs of their regional or occupational mobility.
On the one hand, regional mobility provides access to a larger pool of potentially lucrative vacancies. Accordingly, Manning (2003) states that commutes and wages are positively correlated because job opportunities in thin labor markets arrive only occasionally and workers can potentially achieve higher wages at greater geographical distances. On the other hand, occupational mobility provides access to a larger pool of vacancies that may or may not improve the match quality. Because human capital is mostly occupation or industry specific, a change in occupation is typically connected to a devaluation of human capital (Kambourov and Manovskii 2008, 2009b) . However, wage improvements may still be achieved because all occupational skill bundles comprise a share of general human capital; thus, devaluation is only partial. Moreover, technical changes and/or increasing demand for a product or service may lead to higher productivity in another occupation. However, compared with regional mobility, occupational changes, on average, should lead to lower returns. We focus on Germany, a country in which vocational training is highly standardized and vocational credentials play a crucial role in hiring (Manzoni, Harkonen, and Mayer 2014) . We thus expect occupational changes to have a stronger negative effect than regional changes. However, studies on closure and occupation-specific human capital show that occupational changes also lead to wage penalties in other institutionalized contexts, indicating the general pervasiveness of this mechanism (Kambourov and Manovskii 2009a; Weeden 2002) . We thus expect that
[H7] trans-regional changes within the same occupation lead to higher wage increases than local occupational changes do.
Data
We draw on multiple data sources that together build the foundation of our analysis of the effects on regional and occupational mobility and the consequences for individual wage levels. The retrospective survey "Working and Learning in a Changing World" (ALWA) (Antoni et al. 2010) , retrievable from the Institute of Employment Research (IAB), can be linked to administrative data from the Federal Employment Agency and serves as the primary dataset. The so-called ALWA-ADIAB is a combination of complete life-course data and administrative data at the individual and firm levels Antoni and Seth 2012) . The survey was conducted from 2007 to 2008 and includes 10,177 retrospective computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). It combines modularized self-reports and event history calendars (EHC), improving completeness and dating accuracy (Drasch and Matthes 2013) . The data encompass monthly residential, education, employment, and partnership histories in Germany (Antoni, Jacobebbinghaus, and Seth 2011) . The sample is representative of Germany and includes people who were born between 1956 and 1988 (Kleinert et al. 2011) . The administrative part of the data dates back to 1975 for West Germany and to 1993 for East Germany.
We restrict our analysis to the time span from January 1993 through the interview dates in 2007-2008 because previous administrative data are not available for East Germany. Restricting the time span should also reduce the remaining errors caused by imprecise recollection. Moreover, we exclude leftcensored episodes that began before January 1993. Because we draw on wage information from the administrative part of ALWA-ADIAB, we consider only employment relationships that are subject to social security contributions and thus exclude the self-employed, public officials, and the marginally employed. We also exclude episodes that comprise employment abroad. Applying these restrictions and excluding all cases with missing values, we reduce our sample size to 4,254 persons with 7,940 employment episodes. 1 We link the ALWA-ADIAB to regional unemployment rates that are provided by the German Federal Employment Agency (BA). A third data source is the IAB employment history (BeH), which we use to calculate information on the regional clustering of certain occupations. We use a 10 percent sample of all employees who were subject to social security contributions in 2012. We employ a crosssection of the BeH because 2012 is the first year to incorporate valid measures for the 2010 classification of occupations (KldB2010), which we use in ALWA.
2
Variables
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables for the analysis of the effects on mobility are subhazards for job transitions, signifying the probability of a change in a certain time frame, given that the respective transition has not occurred before or during the employment episode under consideration. However, as we analyze multiple employment episodes per person, a previous episode may have been terminated by the same type of transition. These transitions can occur with or without changing occupations or changing regional labor markets. The former is defined as a change in the two-digit occupation code, according to the KldB2010. Twodigit occupations encompass 37 categories, and changes between these occupational groups most likely indicate a devaluation of human capital, even in the case of employment relations that require more general human capital-such as managerial positions. For example, these groups include "Occupations in computer sciences, information, and communication technology", "Occupations in geology, geography, and environmental protection", and "Occupations in agriculture, animal husbandry, and forestry". A regional labor market change is defined as the start of a new employment episode outside the labor market region of residence-irrespective of where the previous job was situated. We thus even define changes within the same labor market region as a regional change, if the worker resides in a different region. As a job change is associated with ongoing commuting costs, the decision is nonetheless connected to financial restraints.
3 Labor market regions form an area around an economic center and consist of one or more administrative districts. The demarcation is based on commuter links and reduces the 402 administrative districts to 141 labor market regions (Kosfeld and Werner 2012) .
A new employment episode must begin within the first three months after the termination of the previous job. Otherwise, the event is classified as a transition into unemployment or labor market inactivity. Table 1 shows the four subhazards of interest that emerge as a result of this classification. The respective subhazard rates are calculated using the duration from the beginning of an employment period until its termination. Changes in unemployment, labor market inactivity, or self-employment are considered competing risks.
The dependent variable for analyzing mobility effects on wage levels is the logarithm of the daily wage, as obtained from the administrative data. Because of social security contribution limits, wages are right censored. We impute the data, deflate the measures, and calculate daily wages according to the method proposed by Reichelt (2015) . Because self-employment, informal labor, and the employment relationships of civil servants and freelancers cannot be found in the administrative data and because data on hours worked are missing, our results hold only for full-time employees who are subject to social security contributions. However, such employees represent the majority of employees in Germany. Note: Transitions to self-employment, unemployment, or inactivity are not considered in this classification. However, they depict alternative types of job changes that are controlled for in the subsequent analyses.
Independent Variables
The primary independent variables are the restrictions on occupational and regional mobility. Occupation-specific human capital is measured as the time that a worker previously spent in an occupation. Again, we use the two-digit KldB2010 occupation codes. The skill demands of the current job are measured using the fifth digit of the KldB2010 code, which distinguishes between four demand levels. This measure is defined as the level of formal qualifications or equivalent experience that is required to perform the job. The skill demand classification distinguishes between helper and semiskilled work, skilled work, the complex work of an expert, and highly complex work. 4 We subsume the two intermediate levels and obtain three skill demand levels. For the sake of readability, these levels are labeled low, medium, and high. Occupational closure is measured using an index that shows whether legal and administrative regulations exist that bind access to and the practice of the occupation or regulate the bearing of a title (Vicari 2014) . Based on the BERUFENET, Vicari retrieves information on whether the professional exercise of an occupation must meet specific quality standards to protect the general public. The BERUFENET is equivalent to the US Occupational Information Network (O*Net) and lists all occupational titles in Germany, including attributes such as entry requirements. The aggregation of each occupation results in a regulation index for three-digit occupations, which we use as a measure of the degree of occupational closure.
As restricting factors for regional mobility, we include measures for household composition and residence duration. The former is measured with dummy variables, indicating whether a partner or a child of at least six years of age is living in the respondent's household. The latter is measured as the number of years the respondent has spent in the same labor market region.
The control variables include a number of factors that may either influence whether a worker chooses to search for an appropriate job offer locally or outside the labor market region or drive self-selection into specific occupations and mobility types. All continuous variables are centered to produce meaningful baseline transition probabilities that can easily be interpreted. We control for the regional unemployment rate, which is the aggregated and centered proportion of unemployed individuals in the labor force in each regional labor market. The unemployment rate serves as a proxy for the general opportunity structure within the labor market region. As the unemployment rate increases, appropriate local job opportunities become scarcer. Furthermore, we control for the regional clustering of occupations to consider the degree to which an occupation is overrepresented within a labor market region. The variable is calculated from the BeH and is measured using the logarithm of the ratio of one two-digit occupation to all two-digit occupations in a labor market region. This proportion is then compared with the national proportion to calculate regional over-or underrepresentation. To control for the financial means necessary to commute or relocate, we control for the logarithm of the daily wage. Again, we use wage information from the administrative data. To ensure that the variable that represents skill demands does not merely measure individual qualification or education effects and to capture self-selection into complex jobs and regional mobility, we include variables for the highest education degree and vocational and academic training. We also control for the general number of previous job changes to preclude unobserved factors from generally increasing the transition probability of a specific group. All other control variables included in the analyses are listed in table 2. They encompass variables at the regional labor market level and factors measured at the occupational and individual levels. 
Analytical Strategy
The aim of the current paper is twofold. We analyze the effects of mobility cost factors on different mobility types (table 4) and the effects of these mobility types on wage levels (table 5) . For the former analysis, we apply event history analyses, which model transition probabilities over a given time span. Individuals who enter an employment relationship face numerous exit options-for example, transitioning into one of the four states of interest, into self-employment, or into unemployment (or labor market inactivity). We thus face a structure of competing risks and apply Fine and Gray models (Fine and Gray 1999) to calculate subhazard rates and marginal effects for the variables of interest. From previous studies, we know that observed and unobserved subjective factors, such as personal traits and abilities or the willingness to relocate, influence and mediate the relationship between job mobility and migration processes (Courgeau 1985; van Ham 2002; Huinink, Vidal, and Kley 2014) . These factors may simultaneously influence each type of job change and thus increase the general probability of job changes. For example, our calculations show a negative effect of daily wages on all local job changes when calculating independent risk models, such as Cox regressions. The effect vanishes when calculating Fine and Gray models. The rationale is that, on average, higher wages lead to the lower probability of employees leaving their jobs. However, the true probability of a specific job change may not necessarily be affected because all other risks simultaneously decrease, leading to an overall higher probability of employees remaining in their jobs. This higher probability must be considered when assessing whether the true probability of experiencing a specific transition changes. As the Fine and Gray models incorporate all competing risks and model them simultaneously, the factors that potentially affect all types of transitions are considered, and we receive unbiased estimates of the effects of the mobility cost factors on every single type of job mobility. The dependent variable is the hazard ̅ h of the subdistribution (or subhazard) for event j, which is defined as
or the probability of event j within the small interval [ + Δ ) t;t t for all individuals who have not experienced event j or who have previously experienced another different type of event (StataCorp 2013). The subhazard's risk set at every point in time t thus includes employees who transitioned into another status and those who are actually at risk. The model can be written as a proportional hazards model:
where ̅ h j0 is the baseline subhazard for event j, and { ′β } exp x j is the relative risk associated with covariates x. The subhazard ratio (SHR), which we present in the regression models in table 4, is the ratio of the subhazard function at two different covariate values:
Because the SHR is difficult to interpret in terms of the effect size, we report the general transition probability for a reference worker ∏ ( ̅ ) x e and the marginal effects for all covariates of interest. The general transition probability is the cumulative subhazard ̅ ( ) H t j or the integral of the subhazard function ̅ ( ) h t j from 0 to t. We calculate ∏ ( ̅ ) x e for a 120-month period to illustrate the size of the effect. For the reference employee, all dummy variables are set to 0; ordinal variables are set to the reference category; and all continuous variables and month and year dummies are set to the mean. The marginal effects are obtained
e e i comparing the probabilities after changing the dummies from zero to one or after increasing the continuous variables by one standard deviation. Note that these marginal effects only depict changes in the transition probabilities of a reference worker with specific characteristics and should only serve as a reference point for the effect sizes. Because individuals may have failed multiple times, the analytical framework is constructed using clustered duration data from multiple events, in which episode lengths are not statistically independent of unobserved individual characteristics. Thus, we use cluster-robust standard errors. For the second part of the analysis (table 5) , we use a fixed-effects regression of the logarithm of the daily wage on the number of job changes in general as well as the occupational changes within the same region and trans-regional changes within the same occupation, as we suspect that these two types of job changes are mutually substitutable. Because wage effects should be largest at the beginning of a career and because we do not expect linear effects for the number of changes, we use dummies for general transitions and for our changes of interest. We control for the actual experience in the labor market with a regular term and a squared term, all the control variables from the aforementioned event-history analyses, and dummies for all two-digit occupations and labor market regions. The model can be written as
where ( ) y ln it is the logarithm of the daily wage of individual i at time t; exp measures the actual time spent in employment relationships in years; change j it , represents dummies the j job changes of interest; and X k it , represents all k control variables. α i is the person-fixed effect that controls for all time-invariant factors. We use robust standard errors to adjust for serial autocorrelation in wage trajectories.
Results
Descriptive Results
Can workers substitute regional and occupational mobility for one another to improve their labor market positions or avoid unemployment? To answer this question, we calculate competing risk event history models and analyze how the cost factors of occupational and regional mobility alter the probability of transitioning into employment relationships in the same occupation or a different occupation and into the labor market region in which the worker resides or a different region.
We observe approximately 7,900 employment episodes. As table 3 shows, approximately 57 percent of these episodes are uncensored and terminate with either one of the four transitions, a change into self-employment, or a change into unemployment (or labor market inactivity). When changing jobs, most employees manage to stay within their occupations and their regions, followed by local occupational changes and trans-regional transitions within the same occupation. The lowest proportion of employees changes both region and occupation. Thus, within-occupation regional mobility and within-region occupational mobility are seemingly the main strategies for improving workers' labor market positions if local transitions into the same occupation are not feasible. However, the probability of these transitions is not distributed equally over time. Figure 1 shows employment status by month, beginning at the start of an employment episode. The maximum duration that we observe in our data is 181 months, which reflects an employment relationship that began in January 1993 and remained stable until the interview date in 2008. We observe that most transitions occur at the beginning of an employment relationship and that the probabilities of job changes or transitions into self-employment, unemployment, or labor market inactivity continuously decrease over time. After 15 years, approximately 75 percent of all employment relationships are terminated, and the remaining episodes are ongoing. As observed in figure 1 , the transition probabilities are approximately proportional; that is, no transition type is particularly clustered at any point in time.
Results of Event History Analyses
To determine whether regional and occupational mobility function as substitutes for one another in improving workers' labor market positions or avoiding unemployment, we now analyze the effects of the cost factors of regional and occupational mobility on the subhazard rates of different types of job mobility. We expect that the presence of school-aged children or a partner in the household and longer residence duration decrease the probability of trans-regional job Figure 1 . Type of job change by month since the beginning of the employment relationship changes and increase the likelihood of local transitions into other occupations. Accordingly, we expect that more occupation-specific human capital, skill demands, and closure correspond with greater cost factors of occupational mobility and thus reduce the probability of transitions into other occupations and simultaneously increase the probability of trans-regional changes within the same occupation. Table 4 shows the results of four Fine and Gray models for competing risks. The coefficients depict subhazard ratios that indicate an increase in the transition probability for values above one and a reduction in the probability if the values drop below one. To assess the qualitative effect of the independent factors, we include the baseline transition probability for a reference employee within the first 120 months and the marginal effects for all factors of interest. The transition probabilities correspond with our descriptive evidence: The reference worker has a probability of 14.8 percent to locally change within the same occupation and a probability of 12.7 percent to locally change into another occupation. Trans-regional changes within the occupation are less likely (3.7 percent), while transitions that are connected to both regional and occupational mobility are the least likely (2.2 percent).
First focusing on regional mobility restrictions, we observe significant negative effects on the probability for trans-regional changes within the occupation and positive effects for local occupational changes for all cost factors. Locationspecific capital, which is approximated with school-aged children or a partner living in the household and increased residence duration, seemingly not only restricts regional mobility but also drives employees toward local occupational mobility.
The probability that the reference employee will become regionally mobile within the same occupation is reduced by 1.3 percentage points if school-aged children live in the same household.
5 Accordingly, the probability is reduced by one percentage point if a partner is living in the same household and by 1.3 percentage points when the residence duration is increased by one standard deviation, which reflects a 14-year increase. By contrast, we observe an increase in transition probabilities for local occupational mobility. School-aged children in the household increase the likelihood of a transition by 4.6 percentage points. Having a partner in the household increases the probability by three percentage points; an increase in the residence duration by approximately 14 years increases the probability by 2.5 percentage points. The simultaneous shift in transition probabilities supports the first three hypotheses and indicates that both mobility types are substitutes for one another. A partner or school-aged children living in the same household do not affect the probability of a worker being both regionally and occupationally mobile, which supports the assumption that the mixed strategy only applies to a specific group-that is, tied movers.
Focusing on the cost factors of occupational mobility, we find the opposite. For the reference employee, increasing the years spent in an occupation by one standard deviation-which is approximately six years-reduces the likelihood of local occupational changes by 1.5 percentage points. Similarly, higher skill demands-which reflect higher individual investments in schooling, formal Note: Standard errors in parentheses; additional control variables include the number of previous transitions, educational degree, formal training, age, and company size and dummies for reduced hours, public sector, sex, nationality, East Germany, year, and month. Transitions to self-employment, unemployment, or inactivity are treated as competing risks. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05~p < 0.1 training, experience, and/or on-the-job training-make changing occupations less likely. Being employed in a job with high, rather than low, skill demands reduces the probability of changing occupations by 6.5 percentage points. Furthermore, occupational closure makes local occupational changes less likely, supporting our assumption that legal and administrative regulations make abandoning one's occupation less attractive. In addition, we observe a significant increase in the transition probability of regional mobility within the same occupation. The strongest effect is given for skill demands: Compared with that of the reference employee, who has an occupation with low skill demands, the transition probability of an employee in an occupation with high skill demands is 7.5 percentage points higher. The simultaneous decrease in local occupational mobility and increase in regional mobility within the same occupation support hypotheses 4 through 6 and further strengthen our assumption that regional mobility acts as a substitute for occupational mobility when workers attempt to improve their labor market positions. Moreover, the probability of both regional and occupational changes-although already unlikely-is further reduced by occupational cost factors. This finding supports our assumption that regional and occupational mobility are alternative strategies and that employees try to avoid bearing costs for both types of mobility.
Another noteworthy finding is that local transitions into the same occupation become more likely as occupation-specific human capital and closure increase. An explanation for this phenomenon may lie in the decreased competition in the local labor market. Closed occupations should be sheltered from outsiders, and an employee will consequently have more opportunities for job changes. Improving the labor market position is then achievable by changing into the same occupation locally. The same explanation holds for occupation-specific human capital, which improves an employee's market value and thus increases chances in the domestic labor market. The results help explain differential careers across occupations. While some occupations only offer a small number of potential target jobs to realize wage increases, other occupations offer opportunities to transition to a variety of potentially wage-increasing occupations. The former situation should be especially true for highly regulated occupations, such as medical, academic, or judicial careers. Such regulation results in a spatially larger labor market and a greater need for regional mobility. Accordingly, closure and high skill demands result in reduced occupational mobility and increased regional mobility.
Other interesting effects, which alter incentives for specific types of job transitions, follow in the expected direction. Local clustering of one's current occupation reduces the probability of becoming regionally mobile and slightly increases the probability for local changes within one's occupation. We assume that local clustering has this effect because matching within an occupation is already closer to the optimum. On the contrary, higher daily wages increase the probability of becoming regionally mobile, presumably because commuting and relocating become proportionally less costly as overall earnings increase.
The Impact of Occupational and Regional Mobility on Differential Wage Trajectories
Having shown that occupational and regional mobility are mutually substitutable, depending on the cost factors, we now focus on the consequences of this mechanism. We expected differential returns on occupational and regional mobility. In general, job changes should result in wage growth (Fuller 2008; le Grand and Thålin 2002) , particularly at the beginning of one's career and when one's labor market position can be improved. However, compared with occupational mobility, regional mobility is more likely to improve matching and thus increase productivity and wages. By contrast, occupational mobility is frequently accompanied by the devaluation of human capital and should thus lead to lower productivity gains or even losses, particularly if the job transition arises as a reaction to potential unemployment.
In this sense, two groups in the labor market, among others, encounter different options for wage improvement throughout their careers. One group, consisting of employees who are open to regional mobility, achieves wage improvement through job changes into other labor market regions. The other group uses occupational mobility as an alternative strategy to improve wages, which results in smaller wage increases. Depending on cost factors of both regional and occupational mobility, employees should have different probabilities of belonging to one group or the other, thereby eventually contributing to differential wage trajectories.
We focus on occupational and regional job changes-as introduced aboveand calculate the effects of these transitions on the logarithm of the individual daily wage, using fixed-effects regressions. We first calculate a model that includes the first two local occupation and trans-regional changes within one's occupation. The first two transitions cover about 90 percent of all pure occupational and regional job changes that we observe in our sample. A second model includes the overall number of changes to test whether occupational or regional mobility has a differential effect compared with job changes in general. The results are displayed in table 5.
We encounter the typical wage trajectory that we would expect to observe over the life course; wages increase over the entire time spent in employment, but growth is reduced as the career develops. In model 1, we observe positive and significant effects on daily wages for the first two job changes. However, as expected, regional mobility yields higher wage increases compared with occupational mobility. Comparing the different mobility events, a first regional change instead of a first occupational change yields 3.4 percent higher wages ( − ). The explanation is straightforward: Regional mobility leads to better matches because employees have access to a larger pool of adequate vacancies. Local occupational changes lead to lower wage gains, most likely because of a devaluation of occupation-specific human capital. The second regional and occupational changes point in the same direction, although the effect size is much smaller. The reduction indicates that job changes have the highest impact during the job shopping phase, while later changes may be perceived as negative signals (Johnson 1978; Topel and Ward 1992; Schmelzer 2012) . However, the small number of changes per person and our sample size preclude an in-depth analysis of later changes.
As one type of mobility (e.g., regional mobility) may occur particularly early or late in a person's career, controlling for the general effect of job changes is important. Otherwise, the significantly larger effect of pure regional changes Note: Control variables include company size, public sector, regional unemployment rate, regional occupational clustering, dummies for two-digit occupations and labor market regions, month dummies, and year dummies. Observations with missing variables are excluded for all models. There are fewer cases due to the exclusion of part-time employees. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05~p < 0.1 compared with pure occupational changes could be ascribed to the differential returns of early or late job changes. Including the general number of job changes in model 2 tests whether pure regional or pure occupational mobility has a surplus effect in addition to the mere effect of changing to another job. The model shows that regional and occupational changes have a significantly different effect compared with the general effect of changing jobs (e.g., a local change within the same occupation), which confirms previous studies that find generally positive effects of occupational changes (Fitzenberger and Kunze 2005) and regional changes (Sjaastad 1962) . We show that occupational and regional mobility yield differential returns in the labor market. Consequently, the substitutionary function of occupational and regional mobility should be closely linked to processes of wage inequality. Groups with high restrictions for one type of mobility are more likely to choose the other type of mobility, resulting in differential wage returns on job changes. For some groups, differences in wage returns may be directly linked to their mobility cost factors. For example, parents of school-aged children choose to change their occupations rather than their regions, which should result in lower wage returns.
6 By contrast, when changing jobs, employees in jobs with high skill demands should choose regional mobility, resulting in larger wage increases. The mechanism may also be indirect, for example, for migrants, who should have fewer restrictions related to occupational mobility due to human-capital devaluation.
7 In addition, we want to emphasize that the trade-off may also reduce wage inequality. When no adequate local job offers exist, employees are at least able to choose one alternative type of mobility. Thus, in particular, employees with high cost factors for both types of mobility will likely face negative consequences (e.g., higher unemployment risks).
Overall, the results support the assumption that regional and occupational mobility contribute to unequal returns in the labor market. Whereas early regional mobility has a strong effect on wage improvement, occupational mobility is associated with lower gains.
Conclusion
In the labor market, job mobility is central to the matching quality between employees and jobs and thereby plays an important role in individual wage trajectories. Thus far, research on the influences on and returns to job mobility has mostly differentiated between mobile and non-mobile workers, thus only analyzing one specific type of mobility or treating all types of job changes similarly. By contrast, we argue that there are multiple types of job changes with differential returns that are closely linked to one another. We argue that, in this context, both regional and occupational mobility are major sources of wage differentials that have thus far only been regarded separately. We argue that these two mobility types are not independent of one another and that they instead act as substitutes when employees aim to improve their labor market positions or avoid unemployment. In this context, the costs of occupational mobility and the barriers to spatial mobility alter mobility patterns by pushing employees either toward jobs in new local labor markets or into other occupations.
First and foremost, the two types of mobility are a means for increasing wages, and they offer alternative pathways if one type of mobility is too costly. In this sense, as alternatives, regional and occupational mobility increase the number of vacancies that employees can potentially occupy, thus perhaps offering a means to reduce the wage inequality between mobile and non-mobile workers. If workers are unable to change jobs using their preferred strategy, the other strategy provides an alternative. However, because of human-capital devaluation, occupational mobility yields lower returns than regional mobility. We thus argue that substituting one type of mobility for the other constitutes a mechanism for labor market stratification and inequality between certain actors with systematic differences in their mobility costs, which has thus far been neglected in the literature. The trade-off also helps explain differential careers. While some occupations, especially highly regulated ones, offer few potential target jobs for realizing wage increases, other occupations offer a variety of such wage-increasing target jobs, thereby resulting in differences in regional and occupational mobility across occupations.
Drawing on linked retrospective life-course data for Germany with Fine and Gray models for competing risks, we first show that occupation-specific human capital, skill demands, occupational closure, household composition, and residence duration simultaneously affect the likelihood of both local occupational changes and trans-regional job changes within the occupation, which reveals their substitutionary function. Second, using fixed-effects wage regressions, we demonstrate that these types of mobility lead to unequal wage increases. In particular, the first trans-regional job change leads to the greatest wage gains. However, increases from local occupational mobility are only half as large. We stress that this interrelationship is a major factor that influences the type of and the returns on job mobility; it should thus be considered when analyzing mobility effects.
Our analysis not only shows a new mechanism that helps explain the types of job mobility and careers that we observe but also contributes to our understanding of greater patterns of inequality in labor markets. First, we assume differential returns on job mobility to explain wage differences between certain actors with different cost factors in the labor market (e.g., parents versus non-parents, employees with partners versus single employees, and employees in jobs with different skill demands). Second, the trade-off should also contribute to differences between employees who have high cost factors for both types of mobility and employees who may choose between regional and occupational mobility. Lacking access to the trade-off may, for example, impose higher unemployment risks because no alternative is available. Third, cost factors may act differently for certain actors or groups. For example, school-aged children or a partner in the household may impose different costs on the regional mobility of women and men. Fourth, the trade-off may also contribute to differences in wage trajectories between national labor markets. We were able to reveal these mechanisms for Germany, where vocational training is highly standardized and occupational mobility may be lower than in other industrialized countries. We generally expect occupational and regional mobility to serve as substitutes for one another. However, institutional contexts may alter the costs of both regional and occupational mobility, and one must consider different mobility regimes when transferring the mechanisms and consequences found here to other labor markets (DiPrete 2002). For instance, changing occupations should be less costly in the United States, as on-the-job training is more common and the labor market is not as closely linked to the educational and vocational system. Thus, we encourage further research to focus on the international comparability of the mechanisms and consequences associated with occupational and regional mobility as substitutes for one another.
We were only able to reveal a snapshot of the possible consequences of the trade-off between occupational and regional mobility, and future research must work to extend this knowledge by applying the mechanisms found here to other outcomes. For example, the substitution function may have implications for household or family outcomes, as regional mobility is seldom decided without input from other household actors (Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010) .
The trade-off may also contribute to an enhanced understanding of macrosociological changes, their outcomes, and their preconditions. Post-reunification East Germany provides an example of such macro-sociological changes. After reunification, changes in East Germany's highly industrialized labor market structure led to an increase in the unemployment rate from almost 0 to 20 percent, fueling the need for many workers to find new employment opportunities. The change in the occupational structure and the expansion of the private service sector increased the probability of (downward) occupational mobility in the early stages of East Germany's period of transformation (Solga and Diewald 2001) . Over time, East Germany's educational institutions adopted West German rules and regulations. As employees invested in new occupational human capital and as new labor market entrants received certificates that were equivalent to West German degrees (Goedicke 2006) , regional mobility should have become more appealing compared with occupational mobility. Accordingly, we observe increased outmigration in East Germany in the late 1990s (Heiland 2004) . Therefore, the trade-off between regional and occupational mobility and the shift in cost factors provide a potential explanation for mobility patterns in times of institutional transformation.
Other macro-structural changes, such as skill-biased technological change (i.e., Acemoglu 2002; Autor 2013), may further highlight the importance of this trade-off. Such institutional changes alter job requirements and thus create mismatches in the labor market and incentivize mobility. First, technological acceleration in some occupations decreases the amount of human capital that is transferrable between occupations, making occupational changes more costly (Violante 2002) . Second, the skills that an individual acquires before entering a job may become less relevant because of changing technology, which increases the likelihood of mismatches in existing employment relationships (Witte and Kalleberg 1995) . Notes 1. Most missing values originate from lacking information on wages. About 20 percent of the respondents have not agreed to linkage of their survey data to the administrative data. As a robustness check, we calculated the same models without wage information as an independent variable. The results did not change substantially. 2. As a robustness check, we used a 2 percent sample of the Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB) and calculated comparable clustering variables with an older version of the classification of occupations (KldB88). We compared the first half of our observational period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) with the second half (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , which indicated a high correlation among the measures (0.88). We thus assume a high consistency in the occupational clustering variable. 3. As a robustness check, we recalculate our analyses excluding these cases. The results remain stable and do not change substantially. 4. Jobs with different skill demands in a three-digit occupation include the following, which fall under "Office and administration" (714): -Helper and semiskilled work: Menial work in office (Helper) (71401) -Skilled work: Proofreader and encoder (Trained assistant) (71442) -Complex work of an expert: Steno-and audiotypist (Specialist) (71433) -Highly complex work: Interpreter, translator (Expert) (71424) 5. As a robustness check, we included a dummy for children younger than six and found a general negative effect on job changes in the main and a negative effect for women in a gendered analysis. Children younger than six do not impose a cost factor for regional mobility that positively affects occupational mobility. 6. Additional analyses point in the assumed direction (e.g., accounting for mobility types reduces the wage gap between employees with and without a school-aged child in the household, especially for women). However, the small sample size and few mobility events preclude an in-depth analysis at this point. 7. So far, we have assumed uniform effects of the restrictions on mobility and mobility outcomes. We make this assumption to establish a general mechanism that can serve as a basis for further differentiation. However, the weighting of the cost factors may differ for specific groups. Especially having a partner or children in the household may act differently for men and women. Indeed, gendered analyses show that differences between outcomes for regional and occupational mobility matter most for men. Moreover, the cost factors of regional mobility are slightly different (a partner in the household reduces the chance for regional mobility for women but has no effect for men). The results show that a more specific analysis for certain groups in the labor market will entail a more careful analysis and more detailed theory than we are able to establish at this point in time. 
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